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ARTICLE
Popular politicians: the interaction between politics and
popular culture in the Netherlands, 1950s–1980s
Harm Kaal
Faculty of Arts, Department of History, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
From the late 1950s onwards, the Netherlands witnessed a trans-
formation of the emotional codes of politics. A culture of political
leadership marked by notions of duty and restraint, made way for
self-expression and authenticity. This article argues that the inter-
action between the spheres of politics and popular culture played
a vital role in this transformation. The practices and discourses of
popular culture became a signiﬁcant part of the repertoire
through which politicians articulated representative claims. The
article traces how politicians negotiated their interaction with
popular culture, started to cultivate a private persona and even-
tually turned into political celebrities.
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According to Martin Francis, British prime ministers in the 1950s operated within a
‘culture of restraint’. The control of one’s emotions, which was tied to the cultural
norms of British society as a whole, lay at the heart of politicians’ self-understanding.1
Jon Lawrence’s study of British electoral culture has corroborated Francis’s argument.
With the almost complete disappearance of heckling, the 1950s became characterised by
a ‘drab, lifeless politics, that was perfectly suited to the post-war age of austerity’.2
Britain ﬁtted in with Western European political culture of the early postwar decades,
which was, as Martin Conway has observed, ‘neat, controlled and ever so slightly
boring’. In an age of ‘muted temper’, governments were dominated by ‘middle-aged
and middle-class men in suits’ who ruled in ‘relative anonymity’.3 But the 1950s and
early 1960s in Britain were also a period when a culture of leadership marked by
notions of duty, restraint, hard work and self-eﬀacement gradually gave way to self-
expression, attractiveness and being true to oneself. Building on the work of Warren
Susman, Francis links the transformation of the culture of political leadership to
broader changes in the emotional culture of British society during this period.
In the Netherlands, a similar transformation took place, as I will discuss in this
article. In the early post-war years, fears of moral degeneration caused by the experience
of war had triggered calls for rigorous self-discipline. Although restraint remained the
norm, in the 1950s social and political elites as well as psychiatric and psychological
experts started to promote ‘guided’ or ‘controlled’ self-development as a way of stimu-
lating people to strive to achieve their full potential within established social and
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economic communities. In the mid-1960s, the norm radically shifted towards ‘sponta-
neous self-development’: people should be allowed to express their emotions in order to
reveal an ‘authentic self’. This transition coincided with a cultural revolution that
involved, among other trends, the emergence of tolerant attitudes towards prostitution,
soft drugs and homosexuality.4 In a study on the changing styles of political leadership
in the Netherlands, political historian Henk te Velde has given the initial impetus
towards a better understanding of the behaviour of politicians in this new context.
He argues that ‘every period asks for its own type of leader’. Prime Minister Willem
Drees (who led the nation from 1948 to 1958) epitomised the post-war era of recon-
struction. The key ingredients of his governments’ eﬀort to rebuild the country and
transform the Netherlands into a welfare state – hard work, austerity and wage
restraints – were reﬂected in his personality: Drees, presenting himself as a restrained,
hard-working man, projected himself as the average Dutchman.5 In the 1960s and
1970s, a period that Te Velde characterises as one of ‘leadership without leaders’,
Drees’s paternalism, aloofness and frugality no longer held sway as a leadership style.
Now the country’s leaders aimed to come across as approachable, open to criticism and
willing to show their emotions.6
As is clear, the codes and style of political leadership in Western European countries
such as Britain and the Netherlands were fundamentally transformed. What remains to
be explored is how these nations’ politicians interacted with their context – their ‘time’
or ‘period’ – to trigger a shift in the emotional economy of politics and to produce new
notions of ‘good’ political leadership. In this article, I argue that our understanding of
this transformation will improve through an analysis of the interaction between the
spheres of popular culture and the political. The use of the term ‘the political’ implies a
move away from politics as a stable, self-evident domain. The political, instead, is a
historically contingent communicative space whose features and boundaries are subject
to reconﬁguration. Studying the interaction between the political and other spheres,
such as popular culture, shows how these features and boundaries have changed and
have thus produced new deﬁnitions of what is political.7
The interaction with popular culture is particularly relevant because its features have
often been deﬁned as the opposite of ‘political’. In the post-war democracies, politicians
understood themselves as operating in a depersonalised ﬁeld characterised by reason
and a knowledge-based exchange of ideas.8 Against this background, discussion of the
interaction between the spheres of politics and popular culture has often resulted in
normative accounts about the supposedly negative eﬀects of the ‘popularisation’ of
politics, including the favouring of form over content and personalities over principles.9
Recently, however, scholars in cultural studies – and the odd historian – have convin-
cingly argued that political and social historians need to take popular culture seriously
because it provides an important frame through which people construct identities and
through which they experience, and try to make sense of, the world they live in.10 By
paying attention to popular culture we are responding to Lawrence Black’s call to
explore ‘politics in its wider social setting’.11 John Street, in turn, has argued that we
should approach the interaction between politics and a massiﬁed, pluralised popular
culture as ‘a legitimate part of the complex ways in which political representation
functions in modern democracies’.12 In the period under investigation, the practices
and discourses of popular culture became a signiﬁcant part of the repertoire through
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which politicians communicated with the electorate. Elements of communication that
are typically associated with popular culture – looks, emotions, dress, body language, a
focus on the private self – therefore need to be taken seriously as crucial elements of
political communication as well. Although some historians have lately developed an
interest in the interaction between politics and popular culture, scholars in cultural
studies and media and communication science still dominate the ﬁeld.13 A historical
approach is, however, needed to overcome the rather presentist bias of the existing
literature, which locates the interaction between popular culture and the political in
more recent decades, and to situate this interaction in the historical context, linking it
with the layout of the political and media landscape and dominant cultural and moral
values.14
This article, oﬀering an analysis of Dutch politicians’ interaction with popular
culture in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s, aims to improve our under-
standing of how these politicians coped with a set of four crucial, closely related criteria
that marked political representation in these decades: visibility, simplicity, authenticity
and emotionality. Being ‘present’ and visible is crucial political capital, and the posses-
sion of these qualities became a concern for politicians in the 1950s and 1960s when,
thanks to rising aﬄuence, they had increasingly to compete for visibility, as people were
now busying themselves in other spheres of interest: they could watch an entertainment
show on TV, go to the movies or read a lifestyle or pop magazine. Politicians came to
appreciate the opportunities of enhanced visibility aﬀorded by the arena of popular
culture – appearing in illustrated magazines or TV shows, rubbing shoulders with
sports stars and other pop-culture icons – and particularly how they could reach groups
of voters for whom politics was (perceived to be) a minor interest, like youth and
women.15
Moreover, politicians instrumentalised popular culture in order to encase politics in
a more easily digestible package. Through the post-war rise of opinion polling politi-
cians learned that voters lacked knowledge of political agendas and that the segment of
ﬂoating voters was rapidly expanding. In the 1950s and 1960s, the linkages connecting
class, religion and political identity formation, which had been particularly strong in the
Netherlands, gradually loosened and political constituencies lost much of their com-
munal nature. Against this background, popular culture – with its visual instead of
textual orientation – provided the framework for a personalisation of politics, for
instance by putting political leaders’ personalities centre stage and by framing politics
as a clash between these publically conspicuous ﬁgures. A focus on political personal-
ities, on the ‘person behind’ the politician, made politics less abstract, oﬀered voters
new objects of identiﬁcation and diverted attention away from the fact that the
diﬀerences among political parties were marginal.16
In addition to visibility and simplicity, politicians came to understand that authen-
ticity and aﬀective aﬃnity were now vital assets. Until the 1950s, political leaders had
aimed above all to present themselves as members – and leaders – of a particular
constituency united around a shared identity and agenda, and as sincere, serious
defenders of their constituency’s interests. They built trust by presenting themselves
as embodiments of a particular political community and its political platform. With the
demise of these communities, the trust that underpinned political representation
became more personal in nature.17 It was now based on the correspondence between
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a politician’s public persona (‘the politician’) and his private identity (‘the person
behind the politician’): authentic politicians were those who were ‘representatives of
themselves’.18 This development gave a politician’s private life and emotional makeup
political relevance. The (discursive) practices of popular culture became an important
means for politicians to display their authenticity and to construct an aﬀective relation-
ship with the electorate by showing their private selves.19
This article’s ﬁrst section discusses how the iconic ﬁgures of the post-war culture of
restraint – notably Prime Minister Drees, leader of the social democratic Partij van de
Arbeid (PvdA), and Carl Romme, leader of the Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) – negotiated
the ﬁrst cautious forays into the world of popular culture. This is followed by a considera-
tion of how the development of newmedia formats and styles of journalism fed the rise of a
more expressive political culture in the 1960s and 1970s. Zooming in on the emergence of a
celebrity culture in these decades – politicians became celebrities, and popular-culture
celebrities began entering the political sphere – the third section shows how politicians
aimed to turn the celebritisation of politics into political capital. The fourth section explores
the gendered nature of the politicians’ negotiation of popular culture. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal
section highlights how politicians coped with criticism directed at their cultivation of a
‘popular’ private persona. The underlying research has been based on an analysis of general
election campaigns, since this captures the moment par excellence when politicians sought
popular attention. The main sources are the election propaganda of the major political
parties and selections from popular cultural media, such as items on politics that were
brought to the public through a broad range of popular magazines, newspaper articles and
human-interest television broadcasts.
I
In the 1950s, political leaders in the Netherlands believed that control over their
emotions was an essential political virtue. Although such restraint remained the
norm, the sober and tame nature of Dutch electoral culture came under criticism. In
1952, a journalist for a Catholic newspaper argued that over the years politicians’
language and behaviour had become too ‘academic’, and thus the common people
had lost interest in politics.20 Political parties, indeed, worried about declining public
interest in their campaign events. From the late 1950s onwards, they brought in outside
experts to help organise their election campaigns. The social democrats hired an
advertising agency, while the Catholic party enlisted Ben Korsten, one of the ﬁrst
Dutch public relations experts. Korsten recommended the publication of ‘human
interest’ stories about the party’s leading candidates in the non-partisan press and
urged candidates to show up at sporting events or concerts in order to get in touch
with the electorate.21
Dutch political parties carefully negotiated popular culture. Elements of entertain-
ment were meant to serve a higher purpose: to draw people’s attention to serious issues,
to political principles and agendas. The parties enlivened their election meetings, for
instance, by combining the traditional speeches with cabaret, music and theatre or by
hosting a display of ﬁreworks.22 Moreover, the ﬁrst ventures into popular culture were
mainly aimed at voters perceived to be politically ignorant, uninterested and therefore
less susceptible to standard propaganda: women and young adults. Propaganda targeted
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at female voters was packaged as light, accessible reads presented in the format of
magazines or glossies: political statements alternated with illustrations, knitting pat-
terns, non-political pieces on fashion, cooking or music, puzzles, prize contests and, last
but not least, human interest stories about politicians (and their wives) at home (see
Figure 1).23 In a series of pamphlets aimed at young voters in the 1956 election
campaign, the social democrats compared party leader Willem Drees to the famous
Dutch football player Abe Lenstra and the popular American jazz artist Louis
Armstrong. Quite some eﬀort was made to justify and explain these analogies, which
shows that such comparisons were unusual and indeed a bit strained. Voters were told
Figure 1. Propaganda aimed at female voters: ‘The dress of your dreams’ (de jurk van uw dromen).
Women were invited to participate in a price contest and in passing were encouraged to support the
Catholic party KVP.
Source: KDC, KVP Archive, inv.nr. 1488.
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that Armstrong and Drees had both achieved something in life through perseverance.
The analogies, however, had clear limits. Drees himself was not presented like a star:
unlike Armstrong, he was not someone ‘you could have fun with’, but someone you
could trust. Moreover, a discourse of duty and paternalism prevailed: young voters were
reminded to treat politics seriously, as doing so was a clear marker of adulthood.24
The persistence of a culture of duty, restraint and hard work among political leaders also
attests to their careful negotiation of popular culture. In the 1956 election campaign, the PvdA
and KVP, the two largest parties in Parliament, each distributed illustrated campaign maga-
zines that almost completely centred on their respective leaders Drees and Romme, who were
both portrayed at home, among family (see Figure 2 and 3). Their private selves were,
however, eclipsed by their public personae, even in this domestic setting. Romme’s portrait
Figure 2. Both Romme (Figure 2) and Drees (Figure 3) were portrayed at home, with their family, in
campaign magazines distributed across the country in the 1956 general election campaign.
Source: KDC, KVP Archive, inv.nr. 1488 (Romme) and 1496 (Drees).
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literally stated that there were ‘no twoRommes’. In private, Romme remained theman hewas
in public: a ‘self-conscious man’, a man possessing a great sense of ‘responsibility’ towards his
fellow citizens.25 A piece on Drees ‘as his usual self’ contained photographs of the social
democratic leader strolling along the coast with hiswife. EvenwhenDreeswent out for awalk,
said thewriter, he looked ‘serious, trustworthy and calm’ andwas probably ‘thinking about the
next budget’. Dressed in the same suit and tie hewore towork,Drees indeed looked like hewas
ready to head right back to his oﬃce. Seeing him out with his wife therefore reminded the
journalist of the need to ‘take life seriously’.26
The personalisation of politics – more than ever before, the elections of 1956 were
framed by the social democrats and the Catholic party as a clash between their leaders –
thus did not go hand in hand with the construction of a new code of political leader-
ship. In a newspaper interview, Drees explained that from the start of his political career
he had been determined to ‘never show his emotions’ because he considered this to be a
sign of bad leadership. The dominant strand of his personality was his ‘unbelievable
self-restraint’, according to his campaign manager. As a result, even though Drees was a
popular politician – admired beyond his own party – his popularity remained
‘abstract’.27 His popular nickname ‘Vader Drees’ (Father Drees) showed at least some
degree of aﬀective aﬃnity between him and the people, but it also evoked (paternal)
authority. The Catholic party nevertheless tried to use Drees’s popularity against him by
framing Romme, whom non-Catholic voters clearly did not ﬁnd sympathetic, as the
opposite of Drees. Voters were told that unlike Drees, Romme was not seeking
Figure 3. Both Romme (Figure 2) and Drees (Figure 3) were portrayed at home, with their family, in
campaign magazines distributed across the country in the 1956 general election campaign.
Source: KDC, KVP Archive, inv.nr. 1488 (Romme) and 1496 (Drees).
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‘popularity’. He was not like us but was ‘better than us’ – and rightly so because a
democracy needed the best, most capable men to be in charge.28 Romme’s restraint and
the distance between him and the electorate were presented as the hallmarks of a true,
male political leader and were implicitly contrasted with Drees’s feminine yearning for
some form of aﬀective aﬃnity with the electorate. In fact, both Drees and Romme
epitomised the culture of restraint that was typical of political leadership in the 1950s.
II
The 1960s witnessed the gradual transformation of the dominant codes of political
leadership and the emergence of a more expressive political culture. The exit of Drees
(1958) and Romme (1961) from their leadership positions cleared the way for a new
generation. These politicians were faced with a less consensual political climate,
increasing electoral volatility and changes in the relationship between politics and the
mass media. The Social Democrats and the Catholic Party parted ways after more than
a decade of ‘Roman-red’ coalition governments. The partisan logic that had dominated
the press coverage of Dutch politics, with newspapers and magazines acting as de facto
mouthpieces for political parties, yielded to a more critical, investigative approach.
Journalists no longer deferred to politicians.29 Moreover, politicians began to appear
on media platforms that had hardly been attentive to politics, such as popular men’s
and women’s magazines, and television infotainment programmes. In the 1960s and
1970s, the popular press became increasingly interested in politicians’ private lives, in
the ‘human behind the politician’. A focus on emotions, authenticity, and the person
behind the politician was aligned with the rise of the psychological sciences in the 1950s
and 1960s, which inspired people to explore ‘the depths of their “selves” to reveal a
“true” self’. The notion of self-fulﬁlment was reconceptualised: one was allowed (even
encouraged) to express rather than repress or sublimate one’s emotions.30
Female journalists such as Elisabeth Maria Lampe-Soutberg, better known by her
pseudonym Bibeb, and Alice Oppenheim, who both worked for respectable opinion
magazines, were at the forefront of the proliferation of the ‘close-up’ interview. This
new format promised to uncover the ‘authentic’ human being behind the politician’s
public persona. Journalists based their portraits on ﬁeldwork, following a politician in
his day-to-day work and in private settings.31 Bibeb preferred to interview politicians at
home. Repeatedly challenging them to reﬂect on their feelings, their fears in particular,
she described the emotions politicians showed during these interviews and paid atten-
tion to their physical appearance as well.32 In 1959 Erving Goﬀman published his
inﬂuential study The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, in which he distinguishes
the ‘front’ and ‘back stage’ performances of the self.33 Back stage, out of the public
limelight, is where one could be oneself. Journalists like Bibeb sought out access to the
back-stage selves of politicians.
That Bibeb and Oppenheim were female journalists is crucially important in under-
standing the rise of a more expressive political culture. Their personal, indeed intrusive
questions seemed acceptable because they accorded with the dominant perception that
women were mainly interested in the soft, personal and emotional side of politics and
were ignorant about or indiﬀerent to concrete political issues.34 Strikingly, in 1959, the
Partij van de Arbeid asked Bibeb to interview the prominent socialist politician Henk
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Hofstra for a glossy campaign magazine aimed at female voters. Although Hofstra was
portrayed as ‘restrained’ when it came to discussing his private life, readers did get an
idea of his emotional makeup. Descriptions of him as once a sensitive, shy and silent
boy, and of his adult appearance as a ‘well-groomed man’, were meant to put him in
sync with the female electorate. His private persona was, however, clearly demarcated as
separate from his public persona as a politician. One moment he was ‘talking with great
emotion’, but when the conversation turned to politics he became ‘the Hofstra like the
outside world knows him’. His private emotions were counterbalanced by the ‘calm’ he
showed amid political turmoil.35 Here we see a politician who, unlike Drees and
Romme, was developing a distinct private persona, but Hofstra also showed the
persistence of the culture of restraint in Dutch politics: he telegraphed the ability to
remain in control, to be master of the situation and to keep one’s emotions in check
once one entered the political arena.
In the early 1960s, television journalists, too, began to confront politicians with questions
about their feelings and private lives.36 The new interview series FACE TO FACE (in Dutch: ONDER
VIER OGEN), based on a British format and ﬁrst aired in November 1962, was mainly positively
received as ‘penetrating, human, revealing and sometimes even poignant television’. The ﬁrst
interviewee, a former politician, had come across as a ‘warm and human personality’.37 New
techniques allowedTV journalists to visualise politics in a novel way. FACE TO FACE – andmany
similar interview programmes – were ﬁlmed in a new, voyeuristic style imported from the
United States, characterised by a focus more on intimate images and details like gestures and
(facial) expressions and less on distant, static and rather abstract recordings of people talking
and answering questions.With its use of hand-held cameras and zoom lenses, TV bridged the
gap between politicians and the people by presenting viewers with close-ups of their
representatives in what seemed to be an authentic, truthful and realistic atmosphere. The
metaphor of the X-ray repeatedly popped up to suggest that TV provided access to the human
being behind the politician, his or her ‘true’ self.38 Not all politicians were up for such
proximate encounters, however. In the second episode of FACE TO FACE, the government
minister Bauke Roolvink ‘controlled his emotions’, which, according to a critical newspaper
review, resulted in a rather ‘impersonal’ interview.39 Politicians thus faced ﬁrsthand a clash
between the dramaturgy of television and the older, not-yet-vanquished culture of restraint.
Politicians, indeed, were now judged on how well they dealt with the new norms of
television, and, like it or not, they had to get used to it. In the press and among political
parties, television’s impact on politics was repeatedly discussed. Some feared that
principles would lose out to the mere appreciation of politicians’ personalities, but
others stressed that television could help close the divide between politics and the
people. Many politicians and journalists explicitly characterised television as a demo-
cratic tool that could help reanimate popular political engagement. Television, however,
also had a dynamic of its own, one that politicians could not control. Newspapers
reported that TV highlighted previously unnoticed features of politicians: their looks
and how they said things, instead of what they said.40 In the early 1960s, the number of
households with a television grew exponentially, even as there remained only two public
channels – commercial television and a third public channel were introduced only in
the late 1980s. Appearing on TV, therefore, guaranteed a potentially wide audience for
politicians, but they also risked being exposed as inept in front of the cameras.41 Parties
thus began recruiting media experts as consultants. Leading social democrats were told
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that on television they appeared too intellectual, sharp and humourless; they would
have to adopt a more light-hearted approach, particularly if they wanted to attract the
support of young voters.42
Illustrated magazines also played a vital role in shaping a new representation of
political leadership. In the 1970s, politicians started to appear in popular magazine
features which put ‘the person behind the politician’ on centre stage. Women’s maga-
zines like Libelle, Margriet and Avenue and popular men’s magazines like Nieuwe Revu,
Accent and Panorama – all catering to large readerships – printed richly illustrated
interviews with mainly male politicians who were often portrayed at home amidst
family (see Figure 4).43 In 1971, the editor of Nieuwe Revu announced a series of
portraits of leading politicians and remarked that the magazine would print not a
‘political interview, but an open conversation [. . .] about everything which brings the
man you want to vote for closer to you’ – namely ‘his own life, his own family, his own
views, his own concerns and his own sorrows’. He praised the featured politicians for
their ‘courage’ to ‘come out into the open as a human being’. Letters to the editor
indicated that the readership appreciated it.44 Photographs of politicians sitting on the
couch with family or playing a game with one of their children illustrated interviews
that – in the tradition established by Bibeb – were accompanied by captions that noted
how the politician ‘looks young’, or ‘wears a suit that seems to suggest that he slept in it
for three weeks’. Still, not every politician was eager to respond to personal questions
aimed at uncovering his purportedly true self. Even the media-savvy leader of the
Figure 4. Opening pages of an interview with Catholic party leader Gerhard Veringa in popular
magazine Nieuwe Revu, 13–19March 1971. Veringa is pictured playing Mikado with his wife and children.
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liberal-socialist party D’66, Jan Terlouw, wearied of journalists who followed the
campaign and hounded him with questions about ‘how I feel, if I am tired [. . .] I
wish that they would focus more on my political message’.45
For politicians, to engage with the sphere of popular culture was to blur the
boundaries between public and private and to have a spotlight shone on their private
lives and emotional makeups. Terlouw might lament that his political message was in
danger of being overlooked, but politicians had to acknowledge that their private
personae, too, broadcast political messages. These private personae had become politi-
cised; there was now an acceptance that, as the feminist movement (and other liberation
movements in its wake) were apt to say, ‘the personal is political’. In the democratic
climate of the 1960s and 1970s, most politicians were eager to show they had nothing to
hide, that the people had the right to keep close track of them, which also meant their
private selves. Transparency was essential in closing the ‘gap’ between politicians and
the people, and therefore politicians were willing to open up their private personae to
the public gaze, to provide the public a view behind the scenes. The media of popular
culture oﬀered politicians a prominent platform to do so.46
III
Out of this interaction between the worlds of politics and popular culture there
emerged a celebritisation of politics and a politicisation of popular culture. Being a
celebrity suggests a degree of ‘aﬀective aﬃnity’ between the celebrity and the public
even as the celebrity remains ‘like them and above them’.47 With politicians increasingly
appearing in popular-cultural settings – ‘allying themselves with the cultural represen-
tations of “the popular”’ as John Street once put it – 48 and trying to connect with the
electorate by sharing their emotions and private lives, it hardly comes as a surprise that
they, too, were catapulted to celebrity status. The 1960s and 1970s also oﬀered an
unprecedented combination of political polarisation and high-proﬁle drama, the latter
produced by appealing, controversial political personalities and the entertaining story-
lines they generated. The rivalry among the social democrats on the left, the confes-
sional parties in the middle and the liberal party on the right reached new heights. The
substantial political and ideological disputes of these decades were well suited for the
mass-media stage, above all in the battles involving Joop den Uyl, leader of the social
democrats and prime minister from 1973 to 1977, Dries van Agt, leader of the Christen-
Democratisch Appèl (CDA) and prime minister from 1977 to 1982, and Hans Wiegel,
leader of the liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD). Their contrasting
personae made for compelling TV and their confrontations generated news on nearly a
daily basis. Den Uyl, Van Agt and Wiegel all became political celebrities.
A clear sign of their celebrity status was the fact that politicians now mixed with
celebrities from outside the political sphere. In 1977, the women’s magazine Libelle
published a series of ‘surprising conversations’ between politicians (all male) and
celebrities (all female) from the world of sport and entertainment. Unlike earlier half-
hearted attempts to compare politicians to celebrities – such as the pamphlets likening
Drees to Abe Lenstra and Louis Armstrong – the interviews in Libelle stressed the
similarities between these men and their female celebrity counterparts. ‘We have quite a
lot in common. We speak the same language’, the singer Rita Corita concluded after
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meeting with Hans Wiegel: each performed for audiences across the country every week
and had to give their best to win them over, they both received fan mail and found it
hard to satisfactorily combine work with family life.49 Another key indicator of the
celebrity status of leading politicians was their becoming the focus of gossip.50 Gossip
magazines, ﬁrst published in the Netherlands during the 1970s, treated politicians no
diﬀerently than performing artists and sports ﬁgures: there were pieces on their
marriage troubles, their holidays and appearances at high-society events. This was the
ﬁnal step of a process wherein the Dutch press abandoned its deference towards
politicians, although the break with the past was less radical than in Britain and West
Germany, where sensational revelations could destroy political careers.51 The rise of the
celebrity politician exempliﬁed a political culture where popularity, transparency and
proximity had become important forms of political capital.
Politicians were hardly the ‘passive victims of a celebrity-obsessed culture’; far from
it, as Laura Beers has convincingly shown for the British case.52 Drawing inspiration
from American, British and West German election campaigns, virtually all the major
Dutch political parties recruited famous sports ﬁgures and performing artists for their
campaigns in the 1970s. In West Germany, sport celebrities had served as
Wahllokomotive for the SPD and CDU in the 1960s through their endorsements in
the press or appearances at campaign events and on party broadcasts. In the United
Kingdom, the Labour prime minister Harold Wilson also appeared to be well aware of
the positive impact of ingratiating oneself with stars from the world of TV and other
areas of mass entertainment.53 Dutch social democratic campaigners concluded that
celebrities could help imbue their campaign with a ‘trendy’ atmosphere (a blitze
entourage in Dutch) and attract media attention.54 Because of their prominence in
the media and their wide appeal across the electorate, sports ﬁgures in particular were
perceived to be inﬂuential ‘opinion leaders’. Moreover, by associating themselves with
successful stars, political parties could project a positive image of themselves.55
In the 1970s, the PvdA engaged a range of celebrities who expressed their support in
propaganda leaﬂets and participated in the party’s election tour. The social democrats,
however, also reﬂected on the need to carefully balance entertainment and politics. Too
much entertainment, they feared, would undercut their claim that they were ﬁghting for
real political change and represented the interests of common people. Musicians were
therefore asked to perform songs that ﬁtted with the party’s image and agenda. When an
array of celebrities endorsed Den Uyl in an advertisement published in the popular daily de
Telegraaf on the day before the 1977 general elections, they praised not DenUyl as a person,
but rather the political agenda he aimed to implement. The social democrats also justiﬁed
the use of celebrities by arguing that they were instrumental to creating an atmosphere in
which the public became susceptible to the party’s political message.56 This need to care-
fully negotiate the celebritisation of politics seemed to be of less concern to liberal and
Christian-democratic politicians. When several prominent cyclists endorsed Van Agt in
1981 they made no mention of his party and merely praised him as a person: ‘we will vote
for Dries. Why? [Because he is] sympathetic, trustworthy and a good sport’.57 Compared to
Den Uyl, Van Agt was indeed more at ease navigating the ‘culture of sensation and self-
expression’ that went hand in hand with the celebritisation of politics.58
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IV
So far, I have discussed the gendered nature of the interaction between politics and
popular culture only in passing. But gender merits more attention, because it cuts to the
heart of the emergence of the new mode of political representation that I have
considered here. Above all, the career of one of the ﬁrst celebrity politicians in the
Netherlands – the female liberal MP Haya van Someren-Downer (1926–1980) – casts
light on the key role of gender in the rise of a new emotional culture.
In a world dominated by grey, middle-aged to elderly men, van Someren-Downer, an
MP from 1959 to 1968 and the chairwoman of the VVD in the 1970s, was an eye-
catching woman who was adept at using media attention to her own advantage. Always
smartly dressed, she was repeatedly dubbed the ‘glamour girl’ of Dutch politics. de
Telegraaf frequently published stories about her private life and invariably she was
featured in popular magazines and on TV shows. Her claim to fame was, however,
based ﬁrst and foremost on her appearances in the broadcasted sessions of Parliament,
which had begun in the late 1950s. Television cameras recorded how she went against
male-dominated norms of political behaviour through an expressive style that freely
displayed emotions ranging from ridicule to impatience.59 A fellow (male) MP claimed
that van Someren brought ‘too much emotion’ into debate, which stood in the way of
‘reasonable’ discussion.60 The press often contrasted her with the most prominent
female politician of the post-war years, the inﬂuential Catholic MP and long-time
cabinet member Marga Klompé. Unlike van Someren-Downer, Klompé, who remained
unmarried throughout her life, was not eager to discuss her private life in public and
was not very fond of photo and TV cameras. Moreover, in Parliament she did conform
to the norm of self-restraint that characterised the overwhelmingly male milieu of post-
war political culture.61
Van Someren-Downer’s biography substantiates the argument made by Laura Beers
that women could eﬀectively use their femininity to become successful celebrity
politicians.62 Van Someren-Downer, who with a background in journalism knew how
to handle the press, used the media attention she generated to make the case for her key
planks: education policy and the introduction of commercial television in the
Netherlands.63 The reception she received, however, also shows that female politicians
who displayed emotions and revealed their private selves were judged diﬀerently than
their male colleagues. In the case of Britain, Amy Black and Stephen Brooke have
shown that female MPs could either conform to established gender roles by focusing on
‘soft’, feminine issues, or try to blend in with their male colleagues by discarding their
femininity.64 That van Someren-Downer refused to do either – she used her femininity
to push ‘hard’ political issues – explains why she caused controversy. In a recent study,
political historian Carla van Baalen has shown that the press tended to treat the
emotions of male politicians as a sign of their ‘humanity’, whereas female politicians
risked tarnishing their reputations if they let themselves go. In their case such expres-
siveness was treated as a sign of their failure to meet the (male) standards of proper
political behaviour.65 For male politicians, Liesbet van Zoonen has argued, it was much
easier and more accepted to create a ‘hybrid’ persona out of their private and political
performances. Whereas male politicians could give access to their private lives to show
a ‘soft’ side, the emotions that draw attention to the human being behind the politician,
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female politicians in similar circumstances had to account for their ‘absence’ as a wife
or mother, much like women in other professions.66
Second, the gendered nature of the interaction between politics and popular culture
speaks to the fact that women themselves were the prime target of the popularisation
and celebritisation of politics. Women’s magazines and gossip magazines, which were
mainly but not exclusively targeted at a female readership, took the lead in publishing
on politicians’ private lives. They enforced the gender binary by framing the public
sphere as male and the private sphere as the domain of women. Although magazines
like Libelle and Margriet also occasionally discussed ‘hard’ political content – like
political party platforms or the goals of second wave feminism – the personal portraits
of politicians oﬀered an excellent and easily accessible way to introduce the female
readership – no less than 40% of women above the age of 13 read Margriet – to a world
of politics they were thought to be unfamiliar with and neatly tied in with the other
articles in these weeklies, which predominantly centred on home and family life.67
Unsurprisingly, the female celebrities who were coupled with male politicians in
Libelle’s ‘surprising conversations’ series were described as being nervous and awed
when they entered the oﬃce of the politician (who would then immediately make them
feel at ease). This again demonstrated that women were somehow perceived to be ‘out
of place’ when they entered the political arena.
Third, the interaction between politics and popular culture produced a new concep-
tion of political masculinity that turned a politician’s body and appearance into political
capital.68 In the Netherlands, discussion about looks and clothing had mostly remained
limited to female politicians. Press reports on the ﬁrst female MPs who entered
Parliament in the interwar years are ripe with references to their appearance: some
were described as ‘unattractive’ and ‘fat’, others as ‘elegant’.69 In the 1960s and 1970s,
journalists in the popular press also started to discuss the looks and dress of male
politicians. In 1966, the leaders of the established political parties suddenly looked stiﬀ
and dull compared to Hans van Mierlo (1931–2010), the attractive young leader of a
new party: D’66, soon called ‘D sexy-sex’. The press attributed his success as a politician
– his party shook up the political establishment, winning seven seats in the 1967 general
elections – to his appeal among young voters and women.70 In his wake, other
politicians were put to the test: Den Uyl was often derided for wearing wrinkled suits
besmirched with food stains, while Van Agt was characterised as a ﬁt, well-groomed
gentleman, always wearing custom-made suits or – at home – a ‘sporty pullover’.71 His
haircut and his decision to have some spots on his face removed also became matters of
public discussion.72 In addition, both Van Agt and the man who succeeded him as
prime minister in 1982, Ruud Lubbers, were given ample press coverage when they
engaged in sports: Van Agt was an avid road cyclist, Lubbers played ﬁeld hockey and
was one of the ﬁrst European leaders to be seen jogging. As Henk de Smaele has shown,
politicians whose physical features turn into a topic of public discussion, are often
associated with homosexuality. But since sport served as an important arena where the
post-war male stereotype of the athletic, clean-cut, ﬁt man took shape, politicians
engaging in sports could draw attention to their bodies without triggering this politi-
cally risky association.73
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VThe fruits that politicians hoped to reap from their engagement with popular culture
and the opening up of their private personae could, however, easily turn sour.
Journalists who joined them on their election tours critically reﬂected on the ways
that politicians sought the media limelight.74 In the 1970s and early 1980s, many pieces
were published on the PR apparatus of political parties and their use of marketing
experts and political spin doctors, which were often framed as examples of a –
questionable – Americanisation of Dutch political culture. Supposedly ‘authentic’ poli-
ticians risked being unmasked as poseurs, as players of well-orchestrated roles.75 How
did politicians cope with this?
Although all politicians were put under close scrutiny, liberal and conservative
politicians were particularly vulnerable to criticism about their cultivation of a popular
persona. This was because most Dutch political journalists in the 1970s sympathised
with the left; they, and others, believed that popular culture helped preserve the status
quo by diverting attention away from the ‘real’ issues at hand. They expected politicians
to dedicate their lives to solving the pressing political issues of the day.76 Den Uyl lived
up to such expectations. In interviews at his home in an Amsterdam suburb he showed
that his public and private personae largely overlapped: political discussions continued
at the kitchen table, where his politically aware teenage children put him to the test. His
wife, active within the feminist movement, travelled with him on the campaign trail –
not to shake hands or to serve as background decoration, but to prompt him during
speeches or to mount the platform herself.77 Den Uyl’s political opponents took a
diﬀerent approach. As discussed above, they were less inhibited in their dealings with
popular culture and less ambivalent about the celebritisation of politics. Wiegel and
Van Agt in particular were keen to tap into anti-political sentiments and to stress their
lives beyond politics. In the 1970s they increasingly used popular media outlets like de
Telegraaf, Panorama, and the new popular broadcasting organisations TROS and
VERONICA to do so. Van Agt took every opportunity to fashion himself as a political
outsider who had ended up in politics by accident. His love for cycling was at the heart
of his private persona.78 He did not hesitate to cancel political appointments to travel to
the Tour de France or to open a cycling event somewhere in the country. His
popularity, based in essence on the emotional intensity he generated among critics
and supporters alike, was hardly diminished by doubts among political journalists that
his love for cycling was sincere – his biographers claim it was – and their accusations
that he did not take seriously his job as a politician. During election campaigns he
received many letters from voters who praised him as an ‘honest man’ and felt pity for
the attacks he endured in the press.79
Politicians were, nonetheless, walking a tightrope, trying to balance authenticity,
aﬀective aﬃnity, transparency and sincerity. The intricacies of ‘popular’ politics man-
ifested themselves clearly in an incident involving Wiegel in the middle of the 1981
general election campaign. Wiegel, Terlouw and Den Uyl appeared together on
VRAGENVUUR, a TV programme that had party leaders answer political questions from
the studio audience. Wiegel, a father of two who had recently lost his wife Jacqueline in
a car accident, burst into tears when a widower asked him to comment on his policies
with regard to ﬁnancial compensations for widowers. Den Uyl, who was seated next to
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY 15
Wiegel, comforted him. Wiegel was the ﬁrst Dutch politician who shed tears in public
(see Figure 5).80 His tears triggered a debate in the media about whether a politician
under all circumstances should be expected to keep his emotions in check.
Several journalists argued that Wiegel had it coming: he himself had contributed to the
politicisation of his private life. Well aware of popular culture’s potential to cement aﬀective
aﬃnity between himself and the electorate, Wiegel had agreed to several TV portraits of his
life as a widower and to interviews in the gossip magazines Privé and Story with him and
his two children on the cover.81 One of his party’s campaign broadcasts stressed his wife’s
absence by showing Wiegel dropping oﬀ his kids at school in the morning. That this
campaign video was shot by a famous Dutch movie producer also exempliﬁed the stylised,
dramatic nature of Wiegel’s campaign. The liberal party decided to kill the video after the
incident, arguing that it did not want to tap into ‘human sentiments’.82 Meanwhile, an
opinion poll commissioned by theWiegel-friendly popular weekly Panorama had established
that 77% endorsed the rather leading statement that his emotions ‘have at least shown us that
a politician is a human being’.83 The widower who had asked Wiegel the confrontational
question, on the other hand, argued that a politician should be able to ‘separate his personal
feelings and other business [i.e. his political responsibilities]’.84 And where one journalist
stated that the tears had allowed a glimpse of the ‘real Wiegel’, another was shocked by
Weigel’s ‘uncontrolled’ emotions.85 However mixed the response, the incident once again
showed the gendered nature of popular leadership. Female politicians shedding tears risked
being ‘unmasked’: in their case tears revealed a ‘true’ feminine self, a self they had tried to hide
so they could conform to the dominant, male code of conduct.86 Although Wiegel himself
Figure 5. Liberal party leader Hans Wiegel breaks down in tears live on Dutch television, 26 April 1981.
Source: Bert Verhoeﬀ.
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reﬂected that his public tears were an embarrassment, in his case the incident hardly aﬀected
his public image as a quick-witted, powerful politician.
From the early 1960s onwards, in an era of growing electoral volatility and an
increasingly critical political press, Dutch politicians had gradually come to appreciate
the opportunities oﬀered by the platform and formats of popular culture to reach the
electorate in new ways. The interaction between popular culture and the political
resulted in new ways of political communication and triggered a transformation of
the culture of political leadership, as politicians tried to capitalise on the opportunities
for visibility, simplicity, authenticity and emotionality held out to them in the practices
and discourses of popular culture. The culture of restraint did not jibe well with the
formats and discourses of the popular media. Politicians were faced with journalists – in
print media and on television – who were eager to uncover the human being behind the
politician. When politicians started to publicly display their private personae, authen-
ticity and aﬀective aﬃnity became political capital. Although some female politicians
managed to use this new political culture to their advantage, the politicisation of one’s
private life and persona was of greater beneﬁt to male politicians. Authentic politicians
were those who developed a convincing connection between their private and public
personae. Aﬀective aﬃnity, achieved by allowing the people access to one’s emotions,
became a crucial means of cementing ties between politicians and the electorate now
that class and religion had lost their force as markers for political identity formation. A
relationship between politicians and the people characterised by deference and trust
yielded to one of accountability, responsiveness and transparancy.87 Yet, to return to
Wiegel’s tears, the controversy about it did show the risks involved in blurring the
boundaries between one’s private and public personae. Most politicians therefore care-
fully negotiated their dealings with popular culture. This, and the critical way that the
press monitored the politicians’ behaviour, invalidates the narratives of decline that still
permeate interpretations of the interaction between popular culture and the political.
Moving away from studies that stress the detrimental eﬀects of popular culture,
this article has aimed to add a deeper understanding of shifting notions of political
representation to the vast scholarship on the political ideas, institutional relations
and the political and social structures of post-war democracy in Western Europe. In
the era of ‘party democracy’ interpretations of democracy and representation
centred on a parliamentarism of ‘management and control’, not of mobilisation of
the masses and civic engagement, and a bureaucratic, top-down culture of govern-
ment was in place.88 Studying the interaction between popular culture and the
political helps us to better understand the contestation and disintegration of the
established institutions of functional representation in the 1960s and 1970s and
the rise of individualised approaches to political representation and democracy
that centred on personal contact between politicians and the people and an increas-
ing public interest in the personalities of politicians. The platform of popular
culture, which played a vital part in this transformation of the political, therefore
needs to be taken seriously by any historian interested in conceptions of political
representation, the gendered nature of political leadership and the emotional codes
of politics in the postwar era.
This article has focused on what in retrospect was a rather short period, stretching
roughly from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, when a more popular style of
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leadership dominated Dutch politics. In the 1980s, a new generation of politicians
entered the political limelight, led by Christian-democratic prime minister Ruud
Lubbers (1982–1994) and the new social democratic party leader Wim Kok.
Lubbers and Kok represented the ‘boring’ politics of the 1980s, marked by a more
detached and distant political culture that built up trust primarily on the ability to ‘get
things done’.89 ‘I see and hear no compassion, no emotion [. . .], no anger’, an
advertising expert concluded in a critical review of a range of party election broad-
casts in the 1989 campaign.90 As leader of the opposition (1986–1989) and subse-
quently as deputy prime minister (1989–1994) and prime minister (1994–2002) Kok
indeed distanced himself from the political culture of the 1970s by adopting a more
realistic, less confrontational approach, which was epitomised by his consensus-
oriented leadership of a coalition government with the liberal party. Although he
tried to downplay suggestions that he was ‘emotionless’ towards political issues, Kok
ﬁrst and foremost came across as level-headed (nuchter) and ‘boring’.91 Only with the
rise of Pim Fortuyn in 2001 and other populist ﬁgures who followed in his wake did a
more expressive and emotional culture return to the Dutch political stage.
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